These studies date from early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). One perceives in them the U.S. Army coming to grips with terra incognita. They represent a rich retrospective for formulating lessons learned, lots of insights, answers, and projections to test against outcomes.
Of note is the author's conclusion at the first essay, A Short View Of The Arab World:
Somehow, some-way, we must begin to help Arab nations with the problems of poverty and the “youth bulge” in the Middle East. And somehow, some-way, there has to be a solution somewhere to the Palestinian problem, or there will always be ten Usama bin Ladens waiting in the wings to replace the one we are trying to capture in Afghanistan.
Somehow, some-way . . . there has to be a solution somewhere . . . In other words, not a clue. Moreover, note the unexamined assumption: . . . we must begin to help Arab nations . . . . Says who? Says it where in the U.S. Constitution? Says it when in the annals of statecraft?
That assumption descends from clerical and academic eisegesis of The Parable Of The Good Samaritan. So, ultimately, clergy and teachers are responsible for this mess at 11 September 2001 and continuing.
The entire U.S. Intelligence-Foreign Policy Establishment (FPE) was caught dangling their bonnets and plumes -- some even complicit -- when an enemy broke across the moat and through the portcullis to seize the family jewels.
The U.S. FPE prepared defense of a fixed position, than which nothing is more vulnerable to reduction by a resolute maneuver force.
